Not only that the Theory of Everything cannot be reached by empirical science. Experiment cannot even decide which medium level theory is correct and who was supposedly wrong.

Precisely as when I throw a coin so that one me will find itself with heads while the one who will have found tails will be the one who has found tails, so also, at least as long as we have no certainty about what must be rather than what can be, it is equally conceivable that tomorrow we have found clear evidence for that black holes Hawking radiate while in another slightly different variety of worlds, we find ourselves with that black holes do not Hawking radiate, and why would it have to be that we can ever find out whether not both possibilities are instantiated in their own worlds, self-consistently so in all the ways consistency may or may not even be necessary. 

Experimental evidence only tells you in what kind of world you happen to have found yourself, for example, one where evidence points strongly toward Higgs bosons and where you also never won the national lottery jackpot. That does not at all mean that those who predicted Higgs bosons were any more correct than those who predicted that you would not win the jackpot.

They are correct now, in this possibility, and therefore it is that experiment is important, namely, in order to decrease the uncertainty about how the world is in far as it is relevant for us practically, such as whether you have won the lottery. For that, it is better to constrain otherwise still uncertain parameters, for which it is just as well if you thus must partially construct them.

The use of a scientist, especially in the reality of science today, is not so much to turn out correct, or even just to turn up anything directly useful. It is rather, apart from roles such as stabilization of particular social structures, to provide toward a large background of potentiality out of which emerges the later seemingly correct or useful. The correct can only ever be held more or less obvious much later, because it is relative to whether they did then turn out that way in that world, and even then it is never certain before it is not certain, and we are usually mistaken about that.

Who is to say, perhaps if we had rejected science and embraced a particular sort of religion, what would have become of us could be healthier or happier or already know much further in those perhaps meditatively and by racist selection in different dark ages expanded brains, via philosophical routes, how subjective experience and physicalist description fit together, and whether it is thus obvious that black holes have to be a certain way in all worlds.

Certainty, so the naïve scientistic say, is to be found in experimental verification. This is true and false. Fundamental certainty is only found in philosophy, and it says there is none. The scientistic truth is an impoverished concept, an always bracketed one.

It is widely expected that the Theory of Everything (of totality as well as in the sense of a general relativistic quantum theory) needs to be “crazy.” How can we select a likely contender out of the background noise of crazy ideas in order to scrutinize the candidate?

You may suggest whatever you think most important, for example to demand a falsifiable prediction being made. But if one thing is sure about the sufficiently advanced to be justifiably called “the correct crazy,” it is that it is crazy precisely because it will do away with what we hold most dearly! For example: falsifiable prediction. 

 The models show how quantum mechanics is an aspect of a many-worldly space-time structure which is considered as if it is somehow “there,” existing “out there”. However, the result of this description is that the multiversial-space-time totality does ‘not exist “out there,” ’ in John Archibald Wheeler’s words. In some sense it is all in your mind. And this means your mind, as you and me are the same if we pull the description back all the way to the fundamental Kantian core, the unity of apperception, we are but different possibilities of it finding itself, just like the many you’s an hour from now and all the possible past me’s consistent with what I seem to remember.

The theory thus undermines its own basis, because we find spatial models intuitive on particular grounds. We say for example “look, these two points end up at different sections of the model, so they cannot be the same event.” However, if that distance between the points does “not really exist” in an extended, space-time-like way, somewhere, then … what is left of the implying force of that they do not overlap? Nothing but that we apes enjoy our visual cortex so much that our olfactory system has become almost a vestigial organ. 

But this is all wrong, because of course the distance “really exists.” It is this difference which you mean to model in the first place. This is the absoluteness of anything, the absoluteness of space, namely, that it is a priori, that there must be that difference or there is not anything on your mind.

And “the absoluteness of time is that it is its own flow, that it does not need a meta time in order to be able to flow, but that it flows nevertheless because its absoluteness is really the plain absoluteness of its flow directly – it is the reality of this (feeling of) the flow of time that makes it absolute in the experienced perspective and therefore there is time, this is time, absolute time.”

  This was nonsense. Why was it nonsense? Because the words “absolute” and “really” have no meaning, and if we make them meaningful, they end up highly relativized in a fundamental background where all is absolutely fixed as relative. This nonsense is the ‘all inclusively fundamental’ perspective, not the experienced one, which is also fundamental.

And then I kick the ladder I climbed up. A new perspective floats next to them both, this which is nonsense for this reason and that which is nonsense for that reason. On the ‘next level’ we know that words must try but can never go behind the feelings they are evolved to trigger.