Some believe a world state is inevitable, others don't. Some believe advancement in communication technologies benefit irregulars more than regulars in War 2.0, others believe the opposite.

P. W. Singer and others believe utilities in war technology may not be the only thing Wired for War, many don't even consider.

Alexander Wendt believes a world state is inevitable and quantum social science will affect our futures, some just don't give a damn.

Thomas Rid believes as long as frustration, ideology, and the know-how to take action [exist] — militant Islamic fundamentalism will be 'just another feature of the battlefield terrain.'" He believes we need a change in policy where we "place more value on the specific skill-set required of a successful counterinsurgent." Others think counterinsurgents are not the problem.

P. W. Singer believes with the robotics revolution ("a technology that might just transform humans' role in their world, perhaps even create a new species") is mainly driven by our inability to move beyond the conflicts that have shaped human history from the very start.

I believe all of this to be true. A world state will exist, counterinsurgencies will become more successful, insurgencies will be another element on the battlefield terrain, and our new military technologies will continue to be driven from our inability to move beyond the conflicts that have shaped our history. Furthermore, we are Wired for World State War 2.0. Though something tells me I am not quite right, or hope to be wrong.

The main purpose of the post is to present some thoughts of a leader in international relations theory. Alexander Wendt, a Ralph D. Mershon Professor of International Security at the Ohio State University is currently arguing for the inevitability of a world state, and investigating the possible implications of quantum mechanics for social science. As far as the world state goes Wendt understands the evolution of international relations as first being a system of states, then a society of states, world society, collective security, and finally the creation of a world state.

Wendt sees war as a evolving structure. Instead of the once great nationalist wars fought in a state system like in World War I and World War II, or, later a society of states, or, later a world society, now collective securities fight prolonged chains of small conflicts against insurgencies. State lines fade as the world's hegemons unite in coalitions against the ‘other,’ which is a militant, insurgent, fifth columnist, terrorist, or whatever political discourse will be define is as one day.  
Question 1:  Will the world hegemon be a "public state", "a private entity," or combination of both?

Wendt:  I think it would have to be a public state, since one of the criteria for a stable state, I take it, is that it is accountable to the public over which it rules; a monopoly of force held by private actors is hard for me to conceive (since they would then in effect become public actors), although one could imagine "sub-contracting" to private military companies being part of a world state -- as long as those companies remained publicly accountable however.

Question 2:  Is technological advancement contributing to the rise of the world state?

Wendt:  Yes, absolutely.  In my article on the world state back in 2003 I specifically pointed to the rising destructive power (and diffusion) of military technology as an important factor driving world state formation, and today I would also emphasize more than I did then the role of the internet in creating what amounts to a global brain. But all that said, however, I think the struggle for recognition is the most important driver of world state formation, with technological change playing a subsidiary role.

Question 3:  How might a social science of quantum mechanics be utilized by hegemons in the future?

Wendt:  No idea (!).  Once I figure out what a quantum social science might look like -- another couple of years at least, I'd say, maybe I would have an answer, but not yet.